But from your persepective, would you notice a difference?
Well, the from the clone's prespective, no (except for it "living" in a computer of some sort).
But from your perspective, you'd still die. It's a weird paradox.
Say you go to get your brain cloned. You walk into a box where the cloning happens. You walk back out, still yourself. Nothing's changed. You're still gonna die.
But you also walk out as a computer-hosted brain-thingie. You get to live forever. Hooray.
Essentially there's now two of you, with the same memories and everything. One of you has to die.
Essentially there's now two of you, with the same memories and everything. One of you has to die.
One of the great rules of Science Fiction television
One of the great rules of Science Fiction television
Yeah, except in SciFi television one of you would have a goatee.
Cloning my consciousness is
so
off if either of us needs to have a goatee.
I mean, the rest of the world mightn't (okay, everyone corresponding to you off the internet might), but you die, and another you keeps going. How can you get this unique spark of sentience in that vessel?
If I have all my memories, there's a continuity of consciousness, and I'll still be 'me' in my head.
Of course, cloning tech will have to catch up first, 'cause I don't want to have to get used to a different body.
(It probably doesn't help that the last book I read was Broken Angels.)
Does that mean that my clone would have to shave smooth? Wouldn't be a happy camper if he had my mind.
If I have all my memories, there's a continuity of consciousness, and I'll still be 'me' in my head.
Yes. Both of you would still be 'you' in your heads.
If I have all my memories, there's a continuity of consciousness, and I'll still be 'me' in my head.
There's a forking of consciousnesses, though. You'll still be you in two heads, and there will still be death.
There's a forking of consciousnesses
Ooh. Like Emacs and Xemacs.
