In sum (LA Times):
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WASHINGTON — When disaster strikes in the United States, Americans expect a full-throttle response from the government, with whatever it takes to help to the victims — food, water, rescue teams, emergency medical supplies, helicopters, and National Guard soldiers to protect property and life. And the response is expected to be fast and efficient.
That's not how it worked out this time.
Three days after Hurricane Katrina struck Monday, rescue workers still had not reached numerous storm victims on rooftops and highway overpasses whose unanswered pleas for help were captured by news crews. Gunfire kept some rescue workers from devastated sections of the city, and police said they could not guarantee the workers' safety.
News reports showed a crowd of refugees, including children, stranded without adequate food, water or medical attention at New Orleans' downtown convention center, even though it had been designated a shelter after the Superdome filled up. When Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff was asked on National Public Radio why no help had been sent, he said he was unaware of the problem.
And the Federal Emergency Management Agency was using trucks and buses — not airplanes — to transport many of its highly trained units to the New Orleans area, although California had responded immediately to a federal request for urban search-and-rescue teams, Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.) said Thursday.
FEMA told her staff that this was "standard operation procedure," Boxer said in a letter to the agency, but "standard operating procedure is not what we should be following during this time of crisis."
How could such problems bedevil an area long identified as a disaster waiting to happen? Why were federal, state and local officials surprised by the flooding when experts had repeatedly pinpointed issues? How could the federal agencies that are charged with preparing for such emergencies — and have often reacted effectively in the past — have apparently stumbled so badly?
The questions were all the more serious as it became clear that most of the suffering was not in the storied precincts of Bourbon Street, the Latin Quarter or the Garden District, but in predominantly black, working-poor neighborhoods that New Orleans tourists seldom see.